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Abstract

Border Carbon Adjustment and International Trade
A Literature Review
Madison Condon and Ada Ignaciuk
An important source of political opposition to measures aimed at reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) arises from concerns over their negative effects on the
competitiveness of domestic firms, especially those that are energy-intensive and exposed
to competition from foreign producers. Politicians and industry representatives alike fear
that imports from countries without similar regulations can gain cost-of-production
advantages over domestic goods. With many of the major economies of the world
contemplating unilateral action to restrict their carbon emissions (while continuing to
pursue co-ordinated multilateral action), the parallel concern of carbon leakage —
whereby domestic reductions in emissions are partially or wholly counterbalanced by
increased emissions elsewhere in the world — has also arisen. Various adjustments have
been proposed, both in the academic literature and in draft climate legislation, including
levying a border tax or requiring importers to surrender a quantity of carbon permits.
Collectively, these kinds of adjustments are often referred to as border carbon
adjustments, or BCAs. This note reviews the existing literature on BCAs and alternatives
to BCAs and discusses what various researchers have concluded about the efficacy of
BCAs from both a trade and an environmental perspective.
JEL classification: F13, F18, F53, F59, F64, H23, K32, K33, Q48, Q54, Q58.
Keywords: Border carbon adjustment, border tax adjustment, climate change, trade and
environment.
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Border Carbon Adjustment and International Trade
A Literature Review

Madison Condon1 and Ada Ignaciuk2

Introduction
An important source of political opposition to measures aimed at reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) arises from concerns over their negative effects on the
competitiveness of domestic firms. Politicians and industry representatives alike fear that
imports from countries without similar regulations can gain cost-of-production
advantages over domestic goods. With many of the major economies of the world
contemplating unilateral action to restrict their carbon emissions (while continuing to
pursue co-ordinated multilateral action), a parallel concern that arises is that of carbon
leakage, whereby domestic reductions in emissions are partially or wholly
counterbalanced by increased emissions elsewhere in the world. Various adjustments
have been proposed, both in the academic literature and in draft climate legislation,
including levying a border tax or requiring importers to surrender a quantity of carbon
permits. Collectively, these kinds of adjustments are often referred to as border carbon
adjustments, or BCAs.
The dual issues of carbon leakage and competitiveness (energy-intensive domestic
industries facing stiffer competition because of cost increases) have been central
considerations in the design of flanking policies. Among the most common types are
unilateral measures applied to imports — generally, either import taxes or requirements
that importers surrender carbon permits. In recent years, other ideas have emerged on
ways in which such measures could be designed to minimise adverse trade effects, and
some commentators have proposed alternatives to measures applied on imports, such as
voluntary export restraints.
This note reviews the existing literature on BCAs and alternatives to BCAs and
discusses what various researchers have concluded about the efficacy of BCAs from both
a trade and an environmental perspective. In addition, it explores some alternatives to
BCAs that have been proposed in the literature.
Empirical evidence of the effects of BCAs on leakage and competitiveness is limited.
This is mainly due to (i) the overall maturity level of climate policies in developed
countries being rather low, and (ii) that, to date, no BCAs have actually been
implemented (Stephenson and Upton, 2009; Zhang, 2012; Withmore, 2013). Therefore,
most of the examples discussed in this report are primarily of a theoretical nature.
1.
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Background
A preliminary review of the literature reveals that the desirability of competitiveness
adjustment policies remains an open question, with many arguments both for and against.
The primary rationale against the use of tools such as BCAs is that unilateral strategies to
combat climate change are second-best options, the first-best policy being universally
applied emissions taxes (or cap-and-trade mechanisms) (Markusen, 1975). Houser (2008)
and Dröge et al. (2009) argue that unilateral border carbon adjustments could impede
future co-operation on multinational climate agreements and spark protectionist trade
wars. However, in light of the lack of progress at recent conferences of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), some argue that some
individual action is far better than no action at all.

BCAs, competitiveness and leakage
Many OECD economies have already begun regulating domestic GHGs regulation,
some in response to commitments they made through the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol. In light of this, the three most commonly cited arguments for the use of border
carbon measures are: (1) to address domestic constituencies’ concerns about the loss of
competitiveness, (2) to reduce carbon leakage, and (3) to leverage other countries’
participation in climate agreements.

Competitiveness
Most studies indicate that there will be some loss of production by domestic industry
if carbon emissions are made costly at home but not abroad. This argument is mainly
based on the assumption that the industries complying with the domestic policies to
reduce GHGs emissions will move their production to non-complying countries, reducing
the employment opportunities and the economic output within the acting country.

Leakage
Carbon leakage is defined as the ratio of an increase in emissions outside of the
country or countries with domestic climate polices to the reduction in emissions that
occurs within these countries (Felder and Rutherford, 1993; IPCC, 2007). Leakage occurs
when emissions in non-acting countries increase as a result of the climate policies in
acting countries. The OECD (2012) proposes to broaden this definition to account also
for domestic emission increases towards non-priced emission sources in acting countries.

Leverage
Another motivation discussed in the literature for BCAs is an assumption that they
could spur other countries towards reaching a more comprehensive global regime (Helm
et al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2006). The assumption behind this argument is that acting countries
may induce a change in the national policies of non-acting countries. Non-acting
countries may choose to adjust their domestic climate policies rather than being subjected
to BCAs on their exports.

Assessing the effects of BCAs
Many authors have employed a global dynamic computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model to study the trade effects and carbon-leakage impacts of carbon regulation,
ex ante. The models provide a range of estimates on competitiveness and leakage,
OECD TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPER 2011/06 © OECD 2013
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depending on the assumptions made on factors such as price elasticity of demand,
elasticity of trade substitution, returns to scale, and the technological response of
individual industries (Babiker, 2005; Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; Reinaud, 2008;
Monjon and Quirion, 2011; Böhringer et al., 2012).

Competitiveness
Babiker (2005) uses a model with increasing returns to scale and finds
competitiveness effects resulting from an emissions cap in OECD countries. Veenendaal
and Manders (2008), based on their IMPASSE scenario, find that, were the European
Union to act unilaterally to reduce emissions, it would experience a 0.7% decline in
national income; and the rest of the Annex I countries would experience a 0.3% decline.
Non-Annex I countries would experience a decline in national income of 0.1% as a result
of slower growth in OECD countries. They find only modest competitiveness effects for
the European Union when its climate policy is accompanied by a BCA.
Several analyses using CGE models have shown that significant output losses occur
in energy-intensive sectors when a cap-and-trade or carbon-tax regime is implemented,
and that BCAs are insufficient to counteract all of the loss (Burniaux et al., 2010; Mattoo
et al., 2009, Winchester et al., 2011). Burniaux et al. (2010) attributes this to the fact that
energy-intensive industries are affected primarily by the contraction of the overall market
size that comes from carbon pricing, rather than by general international competitiveness
losses. Aldy and Pizer (2009) argue similarly that most domestic production loss stems
from energy-price increases and reduced overall consumption rather than the loss of
competitiveness in its product markets. Monjon and Quirion (2011) analyzed European
climate policy and found that a decrease in EU production of energy-intensive products
can be expected, but mainly due to a reduction in European demand rather than a
shrinking global market share.
Bao et al. (2012) employ a multi-sector dynamic CGE model to estimate the impacts
of a hypothetical BCA regime implemented by the United States and the European Union
on China’s carbon emissions. They note the presence of the energy-substitution effect,
whereby global energy prices are reduced, thus increasing demand in the domestic
market, finding that the emissions reduction impacts of BCAs “are relatively small in
China.” They advocate the use of technology-transfer agreements and other incentive
mechanisms as more effective alternatives to BCAs.
A recent study comparing different models, performed under the umbrella of the
Energy Modelling Forum (Böhringer et al., 2012), shows that BCAs can be effective in
reducing the negative effects that the climate policies can have on competitiveness in
acting countries (Figure 1). Emission pricing of Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE)
industries may put these sectors at a disadvantage with international competitors. For the
scenario in which climate policy is not supported by BCAs (labelled as “ref” in Figure 1),
all models indicated output losses of EITE industries in the coalition of acting countries
(COA) and increase of output from EITE industries in the coalition of non-acting
countries (NCOA).When BCAs are applied (the COA-bca and NCOA-bca scenarios in
Figure 1) the loss of EITE production in acting countries falls on average from 2.8% to
roughly 1% (Böhringer et al., 2012).
Böhringer et al. (2012) point out that the overall costs of achieving an approximately
10% emission reduction by the coalition countries are relatively modest, up to 0.6% GDP
loss. Additionally, when calculating the global cost-effectiveness of the BCAs, in terms
of global changes of GDP, it appears that BCAs improve slightly on global costOECD TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPER 2011/06 © OECD 2013
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effectiveness. With uniform emissions pricing only, acting countries carry a substantially
higher burden, as opposed to non-acting countries. However, when BCAs are applied the
burden sharing is almost equal between acting and non-acting countries, in terms of their
GDP losses.
In general, the overall welfare loss due to climate policies is lower when more GHGs
are targeted by climate policies and more sectors participate in the emission reductions
scheme. For instance, Ghosh et al. (2012) find that including methane, nitrous oxides and
fluorinated gases significantly reduces the potential welfare loss. BCAs strengthen this
effect at the global scale, however, similarly to the findings of Bohringer et al. (2012)
there is strong positive welfare effect (compared with a climate-policy scenario without
BCAs) for acting countries but, for non-acting countries, the effects are negative.
Figure 1. Output of EITE industries in coalitions of acting (COA) and non-acting (NCOA) countries
(% change from Business as usual)

8
COA-ref

EITE output -%changefrom bau

6

COA-bca

NCOA-ref

NCOA-bca

4
2
0
-2
-4
-6

Source: Böhringer et al., 2012.

Ex post econometric studies of competitiveness loss have found differing results in
response to climate-related measures, though generally they find less of an impact than
predicted by the ex-ante models (Jaffe et al., 1995; Levinson and Taylor, 2008;
Kellenberg, 2009).

Leakage
Ex ante studies that focus on heavy industry in the European Union predict rather
high leakage rates: 55% in the iron and steel sector, and between 40% and 70% in the
cement sector (Reinaud, 2008). These predictions have not been borne out by ex post
studies on the first phase of the ETS (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Reinaud, 2008).
However, emissions prices were set notoriously low during this period and leakage rates
OECD TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPER 2011/06 © OECD 2013
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are likely to be much higher as the price of carbon climbs. Zhang (2012) provides a
comparison of ex ante and ex post leakage calculations. There are two possible
explanations for the discrepancy between the predicted and observed amounts of leakage.
The first is that the models used for the ex ante studies are stylised and therefore do not
accurately model the EU ETS. The second is that the ex ante studies omit certain positive
implications of unilateral climate policy, such as induced technological innovation. Zhang
(2012) makes two additional points: first, that high commodity prices during the period
2005-2007 make it difficult to observe the impacts on certain sectors; and second, that
European product standards and specifications help insulate European manufacturers
from foreign competition (Reinaud, 2008; Convery et al., 2008).
Most studies find a significant amount of economy-wide carbon leakage that typically
ranges from 5% to 20% (Elliott et al., 2010; Altamirano-Cabrera et al., 2010; Monjon and
Quirion, 2010). Elliott et al. (2010), using a three-region model, investigate trade in
virtual carbon3 and find substantial carbon leakage, ranging from 15% at low tax rates to
over 25% for the highest tax rate. Monjon and Quirion (2010) point out that most generalequilibrium models predict the majority of carbon leakage occurring, not through shifts in
GHG-intensive industry locations, but through the energy prices channel — i.e. that as a
consequence of tighter climate policies, the world prices of fossil fuels would fall, leading
to an increase in consumption of these fuels in countries without carbon regulation.
Nearly all of the models that incorporate both the competitiveness channel and the fossilfuel-pricing channel demonstrate that most leakage occurs via the latter (Böhringer et al.,
2010; Fischer and Fox, 2009). Of course, the greater the number of countries that agree to
emissions reduction commitments, the less the resulting carbon leakage (Reinaud, 2008;
Böhringer et al., 2011).
Figure 2. Leakage rate in (%), in the climate policy scenario (ref) and the same scenario with full BCAs (bca)
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3.

Defined by the authors (p. 467) as “Virtual carbon is the CO2 emissions associated with the
production of a good”.
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Source: Böhringer et al., 2012.

The aforementioned comparative study by the Energy Modeling Forum shows that
BCAs can be effective in reducing leakage. In that exercise, Annex I countries together
agree to reduce emissions by around 20%. Only the EITE sectors were included under the
climate policy and BCAs were imposed as the carbon-based import tariffs and export
rebates. As a result of this scenario, leakage rates under BCA range between 2% and 12%
with a mean value of 8% (Figure 2). Thus, full BCAs reduce the leakage rate on average
by one third compared with the reference scenario (Böhringer et al., 2012). Note that this
is a global level of emission reductions; some of the reductions take place in the nonacting countries and contribute to the overall goal set by the acting countries.
Ghosh et al. (2012) analysed the effectiveness of BCAs in reducing leakage not only
in EITE sectors but also when the agriculture sector is included in the analysis and
climate policies target, beside CO2, other GHGs. They concluded that when the set of
gases is broader, under the assumption that only EITE sectors are included, the leakage
rate drops significantly to around 1%. Interestingly, when agriculture is included, the
overall emissions are reduced, which means that a part of the acting countries’ target was
met by the emissions reduction in non-acting countries.
When climate policies are imposed on a selection of sectors there may be a potential
increase of consumption in domestic, non-traded sectors such as construction, electricity
generation and local and regional transport, against which BCAs are ineffective
(McKibbin et al., 2010). Wiener (1999) emphasizes that this kind of leakage is worse than
what occurs around most other environmental pollutants because the regulating country
loses the economic benefits from an emitting industry while still suffering the same
environmental harm. Some authors (e.g. Coglianese and D’Ambrosio, 2008) have gone so
far as to argue that incremental schemes short of a global agreement are worse than no
action at all because of these leakage effects.
Another approach to predicting leakage is to look at the impacts on one sector or
industry. Mathiesen and Maestad (2004) examined the steel industry and project a
leakage rate of 26% when a USD 25/tCO2 tax is imposed on Annex I countries of the
Kyoto Protocol. Demailly and Quirion (2008) find that a USD 15/tCO2 tax in Annex I
countries would result in a 20% leakage rate in the cement industry. Lanz et al. (2013)
use a plant-level representation of industrial geography, which allows them to reflect
complex trading patterns, including transportation costs, and regional heterogeneity in the
production process. In applying this method to the copper industry, they conclude that the
copper industry is unresponsive to sub-global climate policies. They attribute this to the
low price responsiveness of both producers and consumers, owing to the fact that
adjustments in the copper industry are constrained by infrastructure requirements and
institutional factors.
Many studies have incorporated various BCA adjustment proposals into their models.
An OECD report completed for EPOC’s Working Party on Climate, Investment and
Development used a CGE model called ENV-linkages to investigate the interactions
between economic activities across sectors and regions, with an emphasis on energyrelated economic activities (OECD, 2012). The report investigates BCAs, direct linking,
and indirect offset-based linking of carbon markets as policies to address sectoral
competitiveness and carbon leakage impacts. One of the findings of the report is that
direct and indirect linking may be preferable to BCAs because they ensure that all leastcost emission reduction measures are adopted globally. The authors suggest that this may
be preferable from a global welfare perspective.
OECD TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPER 2011/06 © OECD 2013
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Winchester et al. (2011) find that a BCA results in minimal reduction in total
emissions and significantly reduces global welfare. Kuik and Hofkes (2010) find that
while BCAs have some success in reducing leakage in certain sectors, the overall
reduction is modest — from 11% leakage without a BCA to between 8% and 10% with a
BCA. Monjon and Quirion (2011) use a partial-equilibrium model, CASE II, to evaluate
the impacts on four energy-intensive industries by various hypothetical BCA schemes for
the EU ETS. When the BCA emissions benchmarks are based on best available
technologies, carbon leakage is significantly reduced in the cement, aluminum, steel, and
electricity sectors.
Aichele and Felbermayr (2011 and 2012) study leakage effects using a derived
gravity equation for the carbon content of trade. They find that that Kyoto commitments
lead to increased imports of embedded carbon in committed countries, resulting in
leakage. Their recent follow-up paper finds that exports of countries that are bound by the
Kyoto Protocol are reduced by 13-14% (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2013). Paltsev (2001)
also found that high rates of leakage occur in these industries as well as in the mining
industry.
Motivated by the acknowledgement that border adjustments are complex to
administer and could face possible legal challenges, Elliott et al. (2012) used a CGE
model to simulate the effects of several “imperfect” border adjustment mechanisms. 4
Using this model, they simulated imperfect system that results in double the amount of
leakage arising from “perfect” border taxes. This result is explained by the fact that
foreign producers have less of an incentive to reduce emissions under an imperfect border
adjustment mechanism.

BCA Proposals
In January 2010, France proposed an EU-wide border carbon tax on goods. This
proposal came out of a broader Environmental Round Table, the Grenelle de
l’Environnement. Box 1 lists two examples of border carbon adjustments that have at
some point been considered.

Concerns around BCAs
Several authors, including Babiker and Rutherford (2005), have argued against the
use of BCAs, because they predict that the costs of emissions reductions would be shifted
from developed to developing countries via terms-of-trade effects. The UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ratified by 194 countries, calls for “common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” based on a country’s level
of development. Given this, many authors argue that it may be undesirable to penalise
4.

In their study, Elliott et al. (2012) consider that a “perfect” border-adjustment mechanism would
require that the importing country determine the emissions from the production of each good
produced abroad. Imperfect border adjustment mechanisms are more likely, because knowledge
of the particular and constantly changing production processes and energy sources of other
countries may not be available. The imperfect BCA mechanisms the authors consider are:
(1) “border tax adjustment based on the average emissions from production of a good in the
importing country”; (2) “a global system of border tax adjustments where the border tax and the
rebate on export are based on a schedule set by a global entity such as the WTO or the UN”; the
schedule they model, for each category of goods, is equal to the global average emissions from
the production of those goods; and (3) “perfectly calculated border taxes … imposed only on
imports without the corresponding rebate on export.”
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developing countries via trade mechanisms. Eckersley (2010) takes this view, arguing
that penalizing developing nations through BCAs, rather than using payment incentives to
regulate, is inherently unfair.
Among many others, Holmes et al. (2011), warn that BCAs have the potential to be
used as a cover for protectionist measures. Taxes at the border could be employed to
make foreign products more expensive relative to domestic ones, especially if they are
coupled with the exemption or grandfathering of emissions from existing domestic firms
or the subsidisation of domestic carbon-abatement technologies. India has already
announced its intention to challenge at the WTO of any BCA implemented by a
developed country (IIFT, 2010). Evenett and Whalley (2009) give an overview of their
concerns about “green protectionism,” arguing that the use of BCAs by Western
policymakers would undermine efforts to get emerging economies to make binding
reduction commitments in emissions.
Box 1. Examples of border carbon adjustments
that have at some point been considered
European Union
Criterion 11 of Annex III of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) Directive states that the
national allocation plans (NAPs) “may contain information on the manner in which the existence of
competition from countries or entities outside the Union will be taken into account.” In the first stage
of the implementation of the ETS, however, no Member State took advantage of this criterion. The
2009 revision to the ETS (Directive 2009/29/EC) added new provisions to address the problem of
carbon leakage. In addition to allowing the free allocation of permits to sectors that were particularly
vulnerable to leakage, the Directive also states that ‘‘by 30 June 2010, the Commission shall …
submit to the European Parliament and to the Council … any appropriate proposals, which may
include … inclusion in the Community scheme of importers of products which are produced by the
sectors or subsectors [at risk for carbon leakage]’’. While this provision explicitly opens the door for
border adjustment mechanisms for imports, it also goes on to add that: Any action taken would need
to be in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, taking into account the particular situation of least-developed countries
(LDCs). It would also need to be in conformity with the international obligations of the Community,
including the obligations under the WTO agreement. (Recital 25) Despite these provisions, no
“carbon equalization system[s]” have been proposed. EU Member States have instead tackled
possible competitiveness loss of EU industries by granting free allowances to energy-intensive
industries.
United States
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), also known as the Waxman-Markey bill,
was passed by the House of Representatives in 2009 but eventually died in the Senate. It aimed to
establish an emissions trading scheme similar to the EU-ETS. The bill provided that, if no
international agreement on climate change had been reached by 1 January 2018, the President
would be required to establish a border adjustment mechanism. This mechanism would have
involved requiring importers to obtain emissions credits from an “international reserve allowance
program”. The details of how to calculate emissions embodied in various imports were not
addressed in the bill.
The Waxman-Markey bill held that these border adjustments would only apply to imports
originating from certain countries. Countries that had imposed economy-wide restrictions on carbon
emissions that were “at least as stringent” as those in the United States would be exempted, in
addition to those that had signed a bilateral agreement with the United States with respect to the
carbon emissions of specific sectors. The least developed counties (LDCs) and those countries who
are responsible for less than 0.5% of total GHG emissions and less than 5% of US imports in
relevant sectors would also have been exempted (van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Monjon and
Quirion, 2010).
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More problematic is the potential for developing countries to retaliate against BCAs
in ways that circumvent the Dispute Settlement Body, as for instance China has pledged
to do in response to BCAs via a “retaliatory regime based on per capita emissions”
(Groser, 2009). In 2009 Groser, while New Zealand’s Associate Minister of Climate
Change issues, called for a moratorium on unilateral border carbon adjustments, which he
claimed were likely to spark a trade war (Deuchrass, 2009). According to Bartels (2012)
China may have used some trade-linked retaliations in response to the inclusion of
aviation in the EU ETS.
There are several criticisms of the various approaches to combating losses of
competitiveness, whether in the form of free allotments or industry tax relief (Quirion,
2009; Wooders et al., 2009). If polluters are simply paid for the full cost of regulations,
then they have no incentive to reduce their emissions. Wood and Etis (2011), in
discussing Australia’s assistance to vulnerable industries, acknowledge that such
assistance may be necessary to protect jobs from going overseas, but argue that the
compliance exemptions must be “tightly targeted” because exemptions increase the cost
of the emissions-abatement programme to the entire country. Others note that there is a
risk that polluters have every incentive to exaggerate the cost of regulation and will be
slow to undertake technological innovation (Dröge et al., 2009). Additionally, they point
out, it is typically far easier to grant economic support measures than to remove them:
governments should therefore be cautious before providing support measures that can be
locked in as entitlements.

Design considerations
Beyond the issues of comparability with existing legislation, there are also issues of
determining the set of goods and sectors to be covered. First, such a determination
involves deciding which goods are at risk. The main argument for a broad coverage of
goods and sectors is the potential reduction of leakage, but including more sectors may
impose larger transaction costs and additional methodological burden. And it may be the
case that, including only a limited number of relevant sectors, e.g. EITE industries, may
deliver almost all the potential benefits in terms of reducing leakage, since the value of
embodied carbon in EITE products, as a percentage of value added, tends to be relatively
high as compared with manufactured products (Cosbey et al., 2012). Second, it involves
proper accounting for emissions attributed to traded products.
An additional argument often made against the use of BCAs is their complexity and
their potentially high cost of implementation. Most of the existing literature assumes that
BCAs would take the form of taxes on GHGs used in the production of a product, levied
at the border. A tax would be levied on imports from countries without equivalent
domestic climate-change-mitigation regulations. Products exported to these countries
could benefit from a tax exemption, or a rebate. While an export rebate would limit the
loss of competitiveness to domestic firms, it might actually work against decreasing
global GHG emissions because it would weaken the incentive for domestic exporters to
make their own production processes less carbon-intensive (Monjon and Quirion, 2010).
Pauwelyn (2007) points out that such an adjustment could also take the form of
permitting and allowances, pre-approving amounts of carbon in imports rather than taxing
at the border. This method might be more desirable for countries that employ cap-andtrade mechanisms at home because it would allow for easier integration into their
domestic systems. Monjon and Quirion (2010) note that, “given the volatility of the EU
allowances price, determining the appropriate tax level applied to importers would be
delicate”.
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Evaluating the amount of emissions attributed to the product
Presumably, the issue of calculating the amount of emissions imputed to exports
produced within a country would have already been resolved under the domestic carbon
tax or cap-and-trade system. EU production installations, for example, have an obligation
to monitor and declare their emissions. Trouble arises when determining the carbon
intensity of imports coming from foreign installations that do not monitor, and may not
already know, their GHG emissions. One option that has been proposed would be to
impose the same monitoring and reporting requirements on importers. Pauwelyn (2009)
asserts that WTO rules would favour a carbon assessment and tax on a “product-specific”
basis, “allowing an importer to demonstrate the actual carbon footprint of a specific batch
of imports.” The downsides of such an approach are obvious. For one, the administrative
burden of monitoring and reporting could be quite high for the exporting country. In
addition, certifying the accuracy of the data would be a monumental undertaking,
requiring much international co-ordination and bureaucracy. There is also the potential
for disputes if the parties could not agree on the appropriate measurement method, as is in
the case of current disagreements over the life-cycle carbon emissions of biofuels
(Laborde and Msangi, 2011; WTO, 2013).
An alternative option that has been proposed would be to use an industry-wide
average emission baseline from the origin country and apply it to each product (Monjon
and Quirion, 2011). Again, this could entail high administrative costs, and the exporting
country might not co-operate fully. A further disadvantage of this approach is that it
discourages individual producers from cutting emissions because its import tax would be
determined by the industry average regardless of its efforts (Cosbey et al., 2012).
Pauwelyn (2009) argues, conversely, that this approach could encourage foreign
governments to enact sectorally focused emission-reduction regulations. Such an
approach, however, does not result in an optimal emissions-reduction strategy.
Godard (2007) and Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) propose that emissions should be based
on those characteristics of the best available technology (BAT) being used throughout the
world. However, taxing each producer as if it were emitting the same GHG as its cleanest
competitor, although it would narrow the price gap between foreign and domestic
producers, seems to offer almost no incentive for improvement at all. Indeed, argue
Monjon and Quirion (2010), it makes little sense to use aluminium produced from, say,
hydropower in Canada as the industry benchmark. There are possible modifications to the
BAT standard, such as using “a technology that is commercialized, perhaps by requiring a
certain market share” (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).
Monjon and Quirion (2011) propose that, instead of a world average BAT, which
would be difficult to determine, the BAT standard could be based on the recently defined
EU product-specific benchmarks. These benchmarks were established by the European
Commission in order to determine the appropriate amount of free allowances in the EU
ETS. They are based on a value reflecting the average GHGs emissions performance of
the 10% best-performing installations in the European Union. Wiers (2008) discusses
several proposals from France; one of which advances the idea that the BCA level could
be determined using country-wide metrics rather than carbon content, such as overall
GHG emissions per capita or per unit of GDP.

Calculating the equivalency of carbon-reduction policies
Most proposals assume that BCAs would only be levelled on those countries that
were deemed to have an insufficient domestic climate-change policy of their own, or
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which were found to be non-acting with international carbon-reduction agreements.
However, the core problem, writes Groser (2009), is how to distinguish between acting
and non-acting countries. The Kyoto Protocol itself holds that compliance cannot be
evaluated until the end of the emissions-reduction commitment period. By what means
would domestic policy makers determine, in real-time, the extent to which foreign
regulations are limiting emissions in order to evaluate the appropriate level of carbon levy
to level on imports? Countries are currently employing a wide range of carbon-reduction
policies including energy-efficiency standards and afforestation programmes. Evaluating
the equivalency of these programmes against a carbon trading scheme would be a
complicated economic feat, leaving ample room for subjectivity.
A BCA scheme that attempted to distinguish among various countries’ GHGmitigation programmes would also be at an increased risk of failing a challenge in the
WTO under the most favoured nation (MFN) principle (Godard, 2007; Pauwelyn, 2007).
See the Annex to this paper.

Alternative instruments to BCAs
Several widely ranging alternatives (or supplements) to border carbon adjustments
have been proposed by both governments and academics. Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2007)
discuss the possibility of imposing an import ban or punitive tariffs on imports from
countries that do not have sufficient domestic carbon regulations. Stiglitz (2006) has
labelled unregulated carbon an implicit subsidy, meaning that products from countries
that do not tax or cap their emissions are not bearing the full costs of their production. He
thus claims that governments ought to impose anti-dumping or countervailing (antisubsidy) duties on imports from countries without GHG regulations.
A more institutional approach has been proposed by Mattoo and Subramanian (2013).
They suggest that more active participation by the emerging economies in reducing their
own emissions and contributing to the international funds that have been established by
the developed countries might unblock the current impasse in the climate negotiations.
Technology transfers and, when necessary, a modest use of BCA, they argue, could
strengthen the co-operation of countries to combat climate change.
Various regulatory standards have been proposed relating to the carbon footprint of
imported products (Fischer and Fox, 2009). The biofuel standards employed by the
European Union, Switzerland, the United States and the US State of California are current
examples of this approach (Moïsé and Steenblik, 2011). In addition to standards for fuels
like the ones mentioned above, Moïsé and Steenblik note the existence of productspecific carbon footprint labels and government procurement guidelines for green goods.
Holland (2009) argues that emissions-intensity standards are a better method for
regulating carbon and can yield higher welfare in the face of “incomplete regulation” or
leakage because, under his modelling conditions, the standard led to higher social
welfare, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Wooders et al. (2009)
discuss a further method of differentiation: the embedded-carbon standard. Rather than
requiring an import payment or permit purchase to be made on the basis of carbon content
of the product, these standards would sort goods into two or more categories. Certain
categories would then be barred from import altogether.
One way to influence another country’s domestic policy is regulatory co-operation
that commits participating countries to maintain regulations of comparable stringency.
For instance, the United States and Canada have collaborated on the former’s most recent
auto emissions standards (Paris, 2012). International forums, like the Clean Energy
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Ministerial, attempt to co-ordinate otherwise unilateral regulatory efforts among
interested governments. Sixteen countries currently work together on appliance and
electronic standards through the forum (Clean Energy Ministerial, 2012). However, apart
from lowering the cost of command-and-control regulations by allowing for compliance
economies of scale, these co-ordinated efforts do not offer much more additional
incentive to enact comparable regulations. In some cases they may give rise to the
standard free-riding problem.
Australia has recently implemented a carbon tax for the 500 largest emitters
(excluding the agricultural sector), which will be replaced by an emissions trading
scheme on 1 July 2015. Under the plan, AUD 8.6 billion is to be allocated over the first
three years of the tax for industry assistance. After the permitting system is in place, the
most exposed industries, such as steel, aluminum, zinc, and paper makers will get free
permits representing 94.5% of industry average carbon costs (Australian Government,
2013). In addition to the AUD 8.6 billion of assistance provided through Australia’s Jobs
and Competitiveness Program, the federal government is also granting additional
subsidies for clean-tech investments in manufacturing (AUD 1.2 billion), the steel
industry (AUD 300 million), and the coal sector (AUD 1.3 billion).
One alternative that has garnered increasing attention in the BCA debate is that of an
export tax or VAT rebate on carbon-intensive goods from countries that otherwise lack
GHG regulation (Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; Copeland, 2012). Since the 1990s, China
has placed export taxes on certain goods in order to limit the export of strategic resources.
In 2007 and 2008 these taxes were substantially increased on metals, chemical products,
fertilisers, coal, steel, and aluminium. At the same time, the standard value-added tax
(VAT) rebate was reduced on certain polluting products. Dröge (2009) investigates the
effects on exports from these policies and concludes that they had a significant tradereducing effect. Monjon and Quirion (2011) evaluated the efficiency of various border
adjustment designs in limiting carbon leakage. They examined four sectors, cement,
aluminium, steel, and electricity within the EU ETS, and concluded that a full border
adjustment, including both exports and imports, was the most economically efficient and
reduced total global emissions.
Voituriez and Wang (2009) claim that measures targeting GHG-intensive industries
can be re-interpreted as an indirect carbon-pricing system. They converted these borderadjustment measures into carbon-based rates for export tariffs in 2006-08 and found that
the calculated carbon price varied widely depending on the industry. They found also
that, for high-value products, like steel and aluminium, the carbon price equivalent was
similar to what was found in the EU-ETS at the time. However, for products like cement
and clinker, CO2 was being underpriced. From this discrepancy, Dröge (2009) concludes
that China’s export-tax policy is far from equivalent to the carbon regulation measures
present in the European Union.
Babiker and Rutherford (2005) performed a comparative analysis of various
adjustment measures, looking at their effects on terms of trade, comparative advantage,
and competitiveness. Import tariffs, export rebates, exemption of energy-intensive
industries, and voluntary export restraints were each examined. Exemptions were found
to produce the least net carbon leakage, but resulted in a much higher price of carbon
compared with the other analysed instruments. Import tariffs (akin to BCAs) were found
to be the most welfare-maximising policy. Fischer and Fox (2009) compare several antileakage policies, including a tax on imports, a border rebate for exports, and full border
adjustment (a combination of the two). They find that all three policies raise domestic
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output and reduce foreign output compared with a world with no adjustment mechanism.
However, they could draw no conclusions about the overall response of global emissions
because it is dependent on “relative elasticities of substitution, size, and emissions rates”.
A more radical and longer-term approach, proposed by Horn and Mavroidis (2011), is
to handle the question of carbon adjustment and associated reduced trade flows at the
level of trade negotiations themselves. They argue that, especially if a BCA scheme is
broadly applied, rather than targeted at specific sectors, one should expect “the imposition
of BTAs to affect trade negotiations, and negotiated trade agreements to affect the use of
BTAs.” With this in mind, they argue that the product classification system used in trade
negotiations, the World Custom Organization’s Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS), needs to be modified in order to account for distinctions based on
the environmental properties of how (imported) products are produced and processed.
This, they argue, would allow for these processes to be accounted for in the tariff
schedules of importing countries.
Several authors maintain that export duties or VAT refund reduction policies ought to
be considered as tools for integrating developing countries into a post-Kyoto global
carbon-reduction scheme (Muller and Sharma, 2005). Wei et al. (2011) analyse various
recent BCA proposals from the European Union and the United States, and find that they
would affect only 6% of the total exports coming from China. They doubt the
effectiveness of unilateral BCAs alone to incentivise Chinese CO2 emission reductions.
Wang et al. (2010) argue that export taxation should be utilised as a transitional step
toward more comprehensive domestic carbon regulation in China.
Muller and Sharma (2005) and Copeland (2012) both point to the 1996 US-Canadian
Softwood Lumber Agreement as a success story of voluntary export restraints that could
be applied to the BCA context. The dispute arose when the United States claimed that
Canada was unfairly subsidising its lumber industry. Following the negotiations between
the two parties, Canada agreed to impose substantial duties on its lumber exports to the
United States rather than having the United States applying import duties. Kinnucan and
Zhang (2004) showed that, from Canada’s perspective, an export limit was clearly
preferable because an “import duty harms Canada’s producers, with no offset to the
Canadian treasury or overall economy.” Export duties, however, extract rent from foreign
consumers.
Yet another trade-related measure that has been discussed is the co-ordinated
lowering of tariffs for low-carbon intensive products among all WTO Members. The
Doha Round was mandated to lower barriers to trade on environmental goods attempted
to create such a list of “green products” but has so far been unable to reach consensus
(Balineau and de Melo, 2011).
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Annex
WTO Compatibility

Much has been written on the topic of whether various proposed BCA designs could
be designed in a way that conform to WTO rules. Article 3, Para 5 of UNFCCC
Convention explicitly states that measures taken to combat climate change, including
unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on international trade. This section seeks to summarize some
key opinions of legal scholars rather than provide an exhaustive discussion. Lengthy
reviews on the topic have been produced by Pauwelyn (2009 and 2013), Brewer (2008),
Ashiabor (2006), Low et al. (2011), and de Cendra (2006). Hufbauer and Kim (2009) and
Cosbey (2009) are just a few more of the authors that, while not drawing conclusions on
legality aspects, consider that measures that attempt to correct for carbon leakage, such as
BCAs, are likely to be challenged by WTO members with export-oriented economies and
relatively lax carbon regulation.
A WTO member may not unilaterally determine that a certain measure is illegal.
Instead, a member may contest another member’s domestic measures as a violation of
WTO law by bringing a challenge to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Following
consultations, and at the request of the complaining Member, the DSB establishes a panel
of experts to adjudicate the merits of the case. If a panel were to find that a BCA measure
was indeed a violation of WTO law and this finding was not successfully appealed to the
Appellate Body, the country in violation would have to bring the measure into conformity
with its WTO obligations, for example, by changing its legislation. If the losing party
does not bring the measure into conformity within a reasonable period of time, then the
challenger may seek compensation, often in the form of tariff reductions or the lifting of
import quotas. If the two parties are unable to reach an agreement on the appropriate level
of compensation, the winning party may seek authorization from the DSB to suspend
trade concessions or other WTO obligations against the member in violation pending
removal of the WTO inconsistent domestic measure or the agreement of a mutually
satisfactory solution between the parties.
A threshold issue when considering the WTO legality of adjustment schemes in the
form of a monetary charge at the border is to determine whether or not the measures at
issue can truly be considered taxes (Cosbey et al., 2012). If the measures are held not to
be taxes in fact, but rather something more akin to import duties, then the measures could
be in violation of Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the
extent that they exceed a WTO member’s tariff bindings (Wiers, 2008). For tax
adjustments on imports there are two relevant principles established under the GATT that
must be adhered to. The first, under Article III of the GATT, is the national treatment
obligation, which requires that imported goods be treated no less favourably than “like”
domestic products. Article I of the GATT establishes the second principle, “mostfavoured-nation treatment”. This holds that a border tax must not discriminate among
imports from different WTO member economies.
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The term “like product,” is not defined anywhere in the text of the GATT and its
ambiguity has given rise to several important WTO cases over the years. Its interpretation
may differ depending on the provision the terms are used. In 1970, the GATT Working
Party on Border Tax Adjustments reported suggestions from the Contracting Parties
regarding the relevant factors in evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, whether two
products were like or not. Those factors included “the product’s end uses in a given
market; consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; [and] the
product’s properties, nature and quality” (GATT, 1970). In EC-Asbestos the WTO’s
Appellate Body (AB) implied that likeness under Article III:4 of GATT is determined by,
among other factors, the competitive relationship between imported and domestic
products: a determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a
determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and
among products. This case implies that it may matter if one can prove that consumers
have a significant preference for goods produced in a less carbon-intensive fashion.
However, some authors argue that market studies most often will show that consumers
generally ignore the processes and production methods (PPMs) of products (Low et al.,
2011).
In 1987 a GATT panel determined that the United States was allowed to impose an
import tax “on certain imported substances produced or manufactured from taxable
feedstock chemicals” so long as the tax also applied to domestic products in the same
manner (1987). Pauwelyn (2013) points out that importantly, in this US-Superfund case,
the panel did not explicitly require that the chemicals be physically present in the product
at the time it entered the domestic market. A similar tax on ozone-depleting chemicals
used in production processes was never challenged at the WTO (Bierman and Brohm,
2005). More recent WTO cases have considered whether to take PPMs into account in
likeness determinations and may also be relevant to this question. For example, in USTuna II the Panel found that Mexican tuna products were “like” US tuna products despite
them being caught in a different manner and perhaps as a result perceived differently by
consumers. The United States did not appeal these findings.5 The panel did not exclude
the possibility that PPMs could be relevant to the determination of likeness in other
circumstances (see para 7.249). This may mean that the WTO might allow for differences
in product “likeness” even if they are physically identical at the time of import.
Production processes, i.e. whether or not the product was produced using renewable
energy, might be accepted as something that may be taken into account when determining
likeness.
Whether or not production processes may be taken into account to determine product
likeness is crucial for BCA measures. Under some proposed schemes, cement made in
China using power generated by coal-fired plants would be subject to a higher tax burden,
than, for example, cement produced domestically using natural gas. So, while a certain
regulation on its face could seem neutral with respect to national origin, as applied it
could still systematically tax imports from a particular country more heavily. While the
WTO distinguishes between de facto and de jure discrimination, both are illegal unless
justified (Pauwelyn, 2013).
Practical problems on how to evaluate carbon emissions embodied in imports also
have a bearing on the discussion of WTO legality. How are border officials to determine
5.

See Panel Report para 7.251 and AB report para 230. This finding relates to Art 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement.
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if imported steel was made with power from a coal plant or a hydropower plant? The
method employed in the US-Superfund case was to ask for voluntary disclosures from
foreign manufacturers. If the importer failed to comply with the reporting standards, then
it was assumed that the production had used the same amount of chemicals as it would
have had it been produced using the “predominant method of production” in the United
States (Pauwelyn, 2013). Another WTO case that may also be relevant is US-Gasoline, in
which the Panel found that the measure treated imported gasoline “less favourably” than
domestic gasoline, in violation of Art. III: 4, as imported gasoline effectively experienced
less favourable sales conditions than those afforded to domestic gasoline. In particular,
under the regulation, importers had to adapt to an average standard, i.e. a “statutory
baseline” that had no connection to the particular gasoline imported, while refiners of
domestic gasoline had only to meet a standard linked to their own product in 1990, i.e. an
individual refinery baseline. The system has obvious drawbacks in the carbon-reduction
context. As discussed above, there would be little incentive for Indian exporters to switch
to cleaner technology if they are being taxed according to methods used in the United
States. The alternative, using the predominant method of production in the foreign
market, would likely raise allegations of de facto discrimination based on national origin
(Pauwelyn, 2013).

Environmental exception under Article XX
Countries wishing to defend their BCA schemes in the WTO could seek to justify
their measure under Article XX. There are two provisions that could potentially offer a
safe haven for trade measures that would otherwise violate the GATT. Article XX(b)
makes exceptions for measures that are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life,
or health. Article XX(g) allows exceptions for trade measures that are related to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. The environmental objectives sought
by the implementing country must be “important and legitimate in character” (USShrimp) and must also fulfil the conditions in the chapeau of Article XX.

“Necessary” under Article XX
There is no exhaustive single test for determining what qualifies as “necessary” under
GATT Article XX (a), (b) and (d). In Korea–Various Measures on Beef, the AB
considered that a person assessing necessity could consider the “relative importance of
the common interests or values that the law […] is intended to protect,” the “contribution
of the measure to the realization of the end pursued” and the impact of the measure on
trade. It added that “[t]he more vital or important those common interests or values are,
the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” a measure designed as an enforcement
instrument.” Bown and Trachtman (2009) suggest that this decision should be taken to
mean that “if a measure contains exceptions or discrimination that cannot be justified by
reference to the purpose that formed the basis for provisional justification under one of
the paragraphs of Article XX, then it will fail the test of the chapeau.” In Brazil-Tyres the
AB employed what Bown and Trachtman characterise as a “suitability test”6 to determine
whether the measure was apt to make a “material contribution” to achieve the relevant
objective. The suggest that this decision should be taken to mean that “if a measure
6.

Bown and Trachtman (2009, p. 3) define a suitability test as a “ ‘simple means-ends rationality
test’ [that] asks simply whether the national measure seems reasonably designed to achieve the
purported legitimate goal.”
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contains exceptions or discrimination that cannot be justified by reference to the purpose
that formed the basis for provisional justification under one of the paragraphs of
Article XX, then it will fail the test of the chapeau.”
US-Gambling established that the burden for proving that a measure falls under an
Article XX exception first falls on the party invoking the defense. Once a prima facie
case of necessity has been established, the burden then shifts to the complaining party to
show that a less-trade-restrictive option is available. If the complainant is able to show
that there are other options available to achieve the same means, then the burden shifts
once again to the defending party to demonstrate that this proposed option is not
reasonably available (Mavroidis et al., 2010). This means that a party asserting the
illegality of a BCA against an Article XX defense would have to prove to a WTO Panel
that there were other less-trade-restricting options to combating the carbon-leakage
dilemma, or, for example, that the threat of carbon leakage did not justify the associated
restrictions on trade.

“Relating to” under Article XX(g)
Article XX(g) allows for exceptions “relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources.” There has been some debate as to what can and cannot fall under the
“natural resources” category. The DSB panel found in US-Gasoline that clean air could
be “depleted” by pollutants, and thus the regulation of pollutant emitting gasoline
combustion was justifiable under this exception. Wiers (2008) extends this finding,
arguing that “air not ‘depleted’ by excessive greenhouse gas concentration caused by
human-induced CO2 emissions may also qualify as an exhaustible natural resource.” The
loss of biodiversity due to climate change may also qualify as an exhaustible natural
resource (Wiers, 2008).
The legal test for compliance as regards the “relating to” requirement has evolved
over many AB decisions (Mavroidis and Horn, 2010). In US-Shrimp, the United States
had banned shrimp imports that had been fished in a manner that lead to the accidental
death of sea turtles. The AB reversed a panel decision that had required a territorial nexus
between the protected natural resources and the WTO Member implementing the trade
measure. ”Horn and Mavroidis (2010) have argued that the AB, in its report on USShrimp, held that the phrase “relating to” implies a rational connection between a
measure and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The import ban on shrimp
in this case was “narrowly focused,” “not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach
in relation to the policy objective.” Crucially, the means employed by the measure was
closely related to the end of conserving an exhaustible natural resource (WTO, 1997;
1998).
Wiers (2008) highlights this decision and argues that for any proposed BCA measure
to fall under an Article XX(g) exception, it must be found to contribute to its stated goal
of reducing the impacts of climate change. The main purpose of the BCA must be defined
for its impact in reducing global emissions rather than for its role in reducing
competitiveness concerns for domestic industry. For this same reason, several authors
have argued that a BCA that rebates the cost of a carbon tax on exports headed to
countries without climate regulation would not pass the XX(g) “smell test” (Ruiz-Fabri
and Reynier, 2010). Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) argue, to the contrary, that a “symmetry
argument” could be made in order to justify an export rebate. They propose that a Panel
might agree with a nation that argues its BCA tax on imports could not exist without a
matching rebate on exports that further “level the playing field.”
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Chapeau
These exception provisions must be interpreted alongside the Chapeau of Article XX,
which additionally requires that measure hold up to two standards. The first holds that the
excepted trade measure must not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail.” Pauwelyn (2013) applies this to the BTA context by arguing that the
implementing nation would still have to justify that its adjustment scheme is applied in
such a way that it takes into account “the situation and history of each exporting nation,
e.g. do they have an adequate climate change policy of their own, [and] what is their level
of development” (Pauwelyn, 2012). The second standard from the Chapeau is that the
measure must not be a “disguised restriction on international trade.” Low et al. (2011)
report that this part of the test considers how it is applied rather than considering its
objectives. The measure must be implemented in good faith and in a reasonable and
consistent manner.
Wiers (2008) expects that this good-faith standard would require that the
implementing country demonstrate its serious efforts to “seek international agreement on
climate change before enacting a carbon tax.”7 In the context of an agreement like the
Kyoto Protocol, which sets emissions-reduction targets for certain dates, it will only be
clear whether parties have met their goals at the end of the evaluation period. Would it be
considered arbitrary or unjustified discrimination, or otherwise disguised restrictions on
trade to levy a carbon tax against certain countries and not others during this period, when
those in compliance have yet to be determined?

Carbon credit considerations
If, instead of a tax, the border adjustment measure took the form of an obligation for
importers to buy carbon credits, other parts of the GATT might apply in addition. Article
XI of the GATT (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) prohibits import
restrictions “other than duties, taxes or other charges”, for example import restrictions
such as quotas and licenses, from being imposed at the border on products from other
countries.”8 On the other hand, Monjon and Quirion (2011) argue that an obligation to
buy allowances would be more in line with WTO rules than one based on a tax because
the pure environmental purpose might be easier to prove.

7

The Appellate Body’s (AB) findings on the US-Shrimp dispute looked at the question of good
faith in relation to international efforts to address the environmental objective at issue (turtle
conservation) in the context of the chapeau reference to ‘unjustifiable discrimination’. (See
paragraph 168 of the AB report, WT/DS58/AB/RW of 22 October 2001.)

8

However, it is unlikely that a country would impose a requirement to buy credits only on
imported goods (which for administrative reasons it might make sense to apply the measure at
the border). Rather, it would likely apply equivalent climate-change measures also to domestic
goods as part of a broader regulatory scheme. In that case, the first paragraph of Annex I, Ad
Article III, would apply: “Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 [of Ad Article III] which applies to an
imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the
imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal
tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in
paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.”
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WTO law in the broader context
Several authors have advanced the arguments that nations contemplating border
adjustment schemes to combat global warming simply should not be concerned about
violating WTO law. Brewster (2010) argues that a multilateral carbon tariff imposed by
the world’s largest importing economies would be nearly as good as a comprehensive
carbon-reduction agreement, pointing out that the European Union and the United States
together consume approximately 40% of the world’s total exports. The WTO can only
authorize retaliatory trade measures.
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